2. cnp3-ebook
3. protocols/tls
4. English
5. Zen

55 ../../protocols/tls.rst:294
	English ↹ ↵ NBS … “ ” ‘ ’ ﹙-﹚ ‐ – — The server also sends a ``ChangeCipherSpec`` message followed by a ``Finished`` message. 88/10000 · 88
56 ../../protocols/tls.rst:297
	English ↹ ↵ NBS … “ ” ‘ ’ ﹙-﹚ ‐ – — TLS Cipher suites 17/10000 · 17
57 ../../protocols/tls.rst:299
	English ↹ ↵ NBS … “ ” ‘ ’ ﹙-﹚ ‐ – — A TLS cipher suite is usually represented as an ASCII string that starts with TLS and contains the acronym of the key exchange algorithm, the encryption scheme with the key size and its mode of operation and the authentication algorithm. For example, ``TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256`` is a TLS cipher suite that uses the ``DHE_RSA`` key exchange algorithm with 128 bits AES in GCM mode for encryption and SHA-256 for authentication. The official list of TLS cipher suites is maintained by IANA [#fianaTLS]_. The NULL acronym indicates that no algorithm has been specified. For example, ``TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA`` is a cipher suite that does not use any encryption but still uses the ``ECDH_RSA`` key exchange and ``SHA`` for authentication. 750/10000 · 750
58 ../../protocols/tls.rst:313
	English ↹ ↵ NBS … “ ” ‘ ’ ﹙-﹚ ‐ – — The TLS record protocol 23/10000 · 23
59 ../../protocols/tls.rst:315
	English ↹ ↵ NBS … “ ” ‘ ’ ﹙-﹚ ‐ – — The handshake is now finished. The client and the server will exchange authenticated and encrypted records. TLS defines different formats for the records depending on the cryptographic algorithms that have been negotiated for the session. A detailed discussion of these different types of records is outside the scope of this introduction. For illustration, we briefly describe one record format. 396/10000 · 396
60 ../../protocols/tls.rst:322
	English ↹ ↵ NBS … “ ” ‘ ’ ﹙-﹚ ‐ – — As other security protocols, TLS uses different keys to encrypt and authenticate records. These keys are derived from the MasterSecret that is either randomly generated by the client after the ``RSA`` key exchange or derived from the Diffie Hellman parameters after the ``DH_RSA`` key exchange. The exact algorithm used to derive the keys is defined in :rfc:`5246`. 365/10000 · 365
61 ../../protocols/tls.rst:329
	English ↹ ↵ NBS … “ ” ‘ ’ ﹙-﹚ ‐ – — A TLS record is always composed of four different fields : 58/10000 · 58
62 ../../protocols/tls.rst:331
	English ↹ ↵ NBS … “ ” ‘ ’ ﹙-﹚ ‐ – — a `Type` that indicates the type of record. The most frequent type is `application data` which corresponds to a record containing encrypted data. The other types are `handshake`, `change_cipher_spec` and `alert`. 212/10000 · 212
63 ../../protocols/tls.rst:335
	English ↹ ↵ NBS … “ ” ‘ ’ ﹙-﹚ ‐ – — a `Protocol Version` field that indicates the version of the TLS protocol used. This version is composed of two sub fields : a major and a minor version number. 160/10000 · 160
64 ../../protocols/tls.rst:338
	English ↹ ↵ NBS … “ ” ‘ ’ ﹙-﹚ ‐ – — a `Length` field. A TLS record cannot be longer than 16,384 bytes. 66/10000 · 66
65 ../../protocols/tls.rst:339
	English ↹ ↵ NBS … “ ” ‘ ’ ﹙-﹚ ‐ – — a `TLSPlainText` that contains the encrypted data 49/10000 · 49
66 ../../protocols/tls.rst:341
	English ↹ ↵ NBS … “ ” ‘ ’ ﹙-﹚ ‐ – — TLS supports several methods to encrypted records. The selected method depends on the cryptographic algorithms that have been negotiated for the TLS session. A detailed presentation of the different methods that can be used to produce the `TLSPlainText` from the user data is outside the scope of this book. As an example, we study one method: Stream Encryption. This method is used with cryptographic algorithms which can operate on a stream of bytes. The method starts with a sequence of bytes provided by the user application: the plain text. The first step is to compute the authentication code to verify the integrity of the data. For this, TLS computes :math:`MAC(SeqNum, Header, PlainText)` using HMAC where `SeqNum` is a sequence number which is incremented by one for each new TLS record transmitted. The `Header` is the header of the TLS record described above and `PlainText` is the information that needs to be encrypted. Note that the sequence number is maintained at the two endpoints of the TLS session, but it is not transmitted inside the TLS record. This sequence number is used to prevent replay attacks. 1123/10000 · 1123
67 ../../protocols/tls.rst:361
	English ↹ ↵ NBS … “ ” ‘ ’ ﹙-﹚ ‐ – — MAC-then-encrypt or Encrypt-then-MAC 36/10000 · 36
68 ../../protocols/tls.rst:363
	English ↹ ↵ NBS … “ ” ‘ ’ ﹙-﹚ ‐ – — When secure protocols use Message Authentication and Encryption, they need to specify how these two algorithms are combined. A first solution, which is used by the current version of TLS, is to compute the authentication code and then encrypt both the data and the authentication code. A drawback of this approach is that the receiver of an encrypted TLS record must first attempt to decrypt data that has potentially been modified by an attacker before being able to verify the authenticity of the record. A better approach is for the sender to first encrypt the data and then compute the authentication code over the encrypted data. This is the encrypt-then-MAC approach proposed in :rfc:`7366`. With encrypt-then-MAC, the receiver first checks the authentication code before attempting to decrypt the record. 811/10000 · 811
69 ../../protocols/tls.rst:379
	English ↹ ↵ NBS … “ ” ‘ ’ ﹙-﹚ ‐ – — Improving TLS 13/10000 · 13
70 ../../protocols/tls.rst:381
	English ↹ ↵ NBS … “ ” ‘ ’ ﹙-﹚ ‐ – — During the last two decades, the deployment of TLS has continued to grow. The early TLS servers were only used for critical services such as e-commerce websites or online banks. As CPU performance improved, it became much more cost-effective to use TLS to secure non-critical parts of web servers, including the delivery of HTML pages and even video services. There is now a growing number of applications that rely on TLS [AM2019]_. 433/10000 · 433
71 ../../protocols/tls.rst:383
	English ↹ ↵ NBS … “ ” ‘ ’ ﹙-﹚ ‐ – — In 2013, the statistics collected by the Firefox Telemetry project [#ftelemetry]_ revealed that 30% of the web pages loaded by Firefox users were done over HTTPS. In October 2019, 80% of the web pages are loaded over HTTPS. In six years, HTTPS became the dominant protocol to access web services. Another look at the deployment of HTTPS on web sites may be found in [Helme2019]_. 379/10000 · 379
72 ../../protocols/tls.rst:385
	English ↹ ↵ NBS … “ ” ‘ ’ ﹙-﹚ ‐ – — Measurement studies that analyzed the evolution of TLS over the years have identified several important changes in the TLS ecosystem [KRA2018]_. First, the preferred cryptographic algorithms have changed. While RC4 was used by 60% of the connections in 2012, its usage has dropped since 2015. AEA started to be deployed in 2013 and is now used for more than 90% of the connections. The deployed versions of TLS have also changed. TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 are now rarely used. The deployment of TLS 1.2 started in 2013 and reached 70% of the connections in 2015. Version 1.3 of TLS, that is described below, is also widely deployed. 626/10000 · 626
73 ../../protocols/tls.rst:392
	English ↹ ↵ NBS … “ ” ‘ ’ ﹙-﹚ ‐ – — Another interesting fact is are the key exchange schemes. In 2012, RSA was the dominant solution, used by more than 80% of the observed connections [KRA2018]_. In 2013, Edward Snowden revealed the surveillance activities of several governments. These revelations had a huge impact on the Internet community. The IETF, which standardizes Internet protocols, considered in :rfc:`7258` that such pervasive monitoring was an attack. Since then, several IETF working groups have developed solutions to counter pervasive monitoring. One of these solutions is to encourage `Perfect Forward Security`. Within TLS, this implies replacing RSA by an authenticated Diffie Hellman key exchange such as ECDHE. Measurements indicate that since summer 2014, ECDHE is more popular than RSA. In 2018, more than 90% of the observed TLS connections used ECDHE. 840/10000 · 840
74 ../../protocols/tls.rst:395
	English ↹ ↵ NBS … “ ” ‘ ’ ﹙-﹚ ‐ – — The last point is the difficulty of deploying TLS servers [KMS2017]_. When TLS servers are installed, the system administrator needs to obtain certificates and configure a range of servers. Initially, getting certificates was complex and costly, but initiatives such as https://letsencrypt.org have simplified this workflow. 324/10000 · 324